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1. Introduction
Energy is central to the environmental and public health 
impacts of economic development. Household energy 
consumption in emerging economies plays a central role 
in projections of future energy use and the environmen-
tal externalities it causes, such as degraded air quality 
and global climate change (Wolfram et al., 2012). 
The demand for energy linked to household consump-
tion exhibits substantial cross sectional variation across 
income levels, even within countries. This suggests that 
future growth in income may further shift consumption 
patterns and energy demand. As the bulk of growth in 
energy consumption and associated emissions is expect-
ed to come from fast-growing developing countries, un-
derstanding the implications of these shifts is crucial. De-
spite this, empirical estimates of how energy use changes 
as incomes rise (income elasticities) are often limited 
by a lack of data. As a result, analysts usually rely on as-
sumptions—such as unitary income elasticities derived 
from homothetic preferences. We investigate the impor-
tance of these simplifications for projections and policy 
evaluation.
China is the world’s largest developing economy, energy 
user, and emitter of CO2. Outcomes in China will have 
implications for global energy use and hold lessons for 
other developing countries. Our analysis exploits the 
large existing variation in household incomes in China 
to identify the relationship between household income 
and expenditure patterns. We estimate Engel curves for 
energy goods using a new energy-specific survey of Chi-
nese household consumption and for the indirect energy 
embodied in the production of all other goods using of-
ficial consumption statistics and input-output tables. We 
employ flexible functional forms that allow for non-ho-
mothetic behavior and non-constant income elasticity, 
approximating a full rank demand system, and control 
for important co-variates. We perform estimations for 
urban and rural households in each province, capturing 
two policy-relevant dimensions of incidence in China 
(Ming & Zhao, 2006; Zhang et al., 2013).
We then study the implications of our empirically-de-
rived estimates on projections and policy costs in general 
equilibrium. To do so, we develop a novel methodolo-
gy to calibrate a recursive-dynamic general equilibrium 
(GE) model to estimated Engel Curves as a function of 
between-period changes in income. The model provides 
projected outcomes for China based on the empirical-
ly-derived calibrated preferences. To evaluate the impact 
of income-driven shifts in consumption, we compare our 
simulation results with those based on a standard homo-
thetic constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) demand 
system with unitary income elasticity. The GE model 
captures feedbacks between changing consumption pat-
terns and supply, including production and trade flows, 
as well as interactions with energy and climate policy. 
These feedbacks would not be captured in a partial equi-
librium study of shifting consumption patterns.
We also use the model to simulate a climate policy con-
sisting of national CO2 emissions targets implemented 
via a nationwide CO2 price in all sectors. While stylized 
in nature, the policy is designed to be consistent with 
China’s climate pledge of reducing energy intensity by 
60-65% in 2030, relative to 2005. The model allows us 
to examine a number of the “channels of climate policy 
incidence” documented by Fullerton (2011).1
Finally, we decompose the general equilibrium effects 
of income-driven shifts in consumption patterns on the 
policy’s welfare costs across household types. We disen-
tangle the policy’s impact on household incomes (which 
we refer to as “income side” impacts) from its impact 
on purchasing power (“consumption side” impacts). 
The later are determined by the interaction between 
relative price changes and household consumption pat-
terns. We show that both are affected by the preference 
specification.
We believe our analysis to be the first to investigate the 
interactions between the income-driven dynamics of 
consumption patterns, energy demand and climate pol-
icy. We focus on three main findings. First, compared to 
unit-income elasticity homothetic preferences, our esti-
mated Engel curves yield considerably lower projections 
of household and total demand for energy in China as 
well as lower associated CO2 emissions. Household emis-
sions in 2030 are 61% lower, and national emissions are 
reduced by 8%. This result reflects the fact that, in China, 
the energy and CO2 intensity of consumption decreases 
with income at almost all income levels.
Second, moving to calibrated preferences lowers the av-
erage welfare cost of reaching a given emissions target. 
Climate policy is considerably less stringent, particularly 
for households as their consumption baskets grow rela-
tively cleaner over time. Average welfare loss (measured 
as consumption loss) is 54% lower—good news for poli-
cy makers who seek to limit the impact of climate policy 
on domestic households. GDP loss is 11% lower, a small-
er difference which reflects the fact that a portion of the 
residual burden of emissions reduction is shifted to other 
parts of the economy.
1  Our analysis captures five of the six “channels of incidence” from 
Fullerton (2011): (1) increased prices of carbon-intensive goods, (2) 
changes in relative returns to factors of production, (3) allocation of 
revenues from carbon pricing, (4) dynamic effects, (5) capitalization 
of all those effects into prices of land and other resources. We do not 
capture (6) benefits from improved environmental quality. A partial 
equilibrium analysis would only capture a subset of these channels.
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Third, CO2 pricing—which is initially very regressive—
becomes more distributionally neutral under calibrated 
preferences. While variation in welfare impacts across 
income levels falls for both consumption and income 
side impacts, it decreases more than proportionally on 
the consumption side. Low income households, which 
are initially more exposed to carbon pricing through the 
consumption channel, reduce the CO2 intensity of their 
consumption baskets faster than high income house-
holds. Shifting consumption patterns thus drive conver-
gence in the CO2 intensity of consumption across house-
hold types, which in turn reduces the variation in impacts 
across income levels. General equilibrium effects cause 
variation in income side impacts to decrease as well.
Calibrated preferences also reveal that income growth 
shifts household consumption away from goods which 
tend to be consumed near their location of production 
(such as agriculture and coal) and towards more easily 
traded goods (manufacturing and oil). As a result, the 
spatial colocation of the consumption and production of 
CO2 will decrease over time, leading to a de-linking be-
tween the consumption and income side impacts across 
provinces. This and other general equilibrium effects al-
ter the geographical ranking of winners and losers under 
climate policy.
Our results have implications for climate policy design. 
We show how empirically calibrated non-homothetic 
preferences can substantially alter baseline projections 
of CO2 emissions growth, as well as the magnitude and 
distribution of policy costs. The 2015 Paris Climate 
Agreement commits all countries to act to mitigate 
CO2 emissions (UFCCC, 2015; NDRC, 2015). As policy 
communities develop national mitigation plans and pol-
icies, distributional impacts are of major concern (Met-
calf et al., 2008; Rausch et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2013). 
Our method can increase the empirical realism of pro-
jections that ex ante comparisons of climate policy effort 
are based on (Aldy et al., 2015).
Our results imply that policy evaluation exercises as-
suming unitary income elasticities would tend to over-
state the costs of climate policy in China. Studies to date, 
including some by the authors, typically make such as-
sumptions (see for example Zhang (2000); Zhang et al. 
(2016a); Cao et al. (2009); Wang et al. (2009); Shi et al. 
(2010)). While our empirical estimates and their impli-
cations for projections and policy are likely specific to 
China, they suggest that income-driven changes in con-
sumption patterns can affect energy and CO2 emissions 
projections as well as the magnitude, distribution, and 
dynamics of policy incidence. These effects may be large 
in other parts of the developing world in which preex-
isting disparities in income are large and income levels 
are changing dramatically and unevenly over relatively 
short time horizons. Our results underscore the impor-
tance of correctly anticipating the effect of rising incomes 
on energy demand and understanding their implications 
in general equilibrium. We describe a methodology that 
can be applied to any country in which energy-specific 
household microdata is available.
2. Estimating the Relationship 
between Consumption Patterns 
and Income
2.1 Empirical Evidence for Non-homothetic 
Preferences
Since the foundational work of Engel (1895), Working 
(1943) and Leser (1963), scholars have recognized in-
come as an important determinant of household con-
sumption patterns. A large body of literature has focused 
on estimating income elasticities of household demand 
for goods and services, including housing (Carliner, 
1973), electricity (Branch, 1993), food and agricultural 
products (Haque, 2005; Chern et al., 2003), and studies 
that estimate elasticities for a wide range of consump-
tion goods across multiple countries (Houthakker, 1957; 
Caron et al., 2014). Many estimates of income elasticities 
of demand for goods and services are found to deviate 
from unity and to vary by income level. For example, 
the income elasticities of food (Engel’s Law, Houthakker 
(1957)) and clothing (Schwabe’s Law, Haque (2005)) are 
generally found to be lower than one. In the case of Chi-
na, Zhou et al. (2012) find evidence that, in the process of 
economic development, some luxury goods such as beef, 
fish and poultry turn into necessities, implying elastici-
ties that move from above to below unity as income rises.
Insights from the studies cited above, which rely on ag-
gregate (often national) data to provide ‘macro’ estimates 
of the income-consumption relationship, have gradually 
been augmented by a body of analysis based on ‘micro’ 
household survey data. Such data allow more precise es-
timation of the relationship, better identification of the 
role of income, and capture the dynamics of adoption by 
differentiating between the intensive and the extensive 
margins of consumption. The latter is particularly im-
portant in the context of energy use where different types 
of energy may be consumed. Most ‘micro’ studies focus-
ing on energy demand rely on developed-world surveys, 
such as from the European Union (Reinders et al., 2003), 
the United States (Branch, 1993) or Denmark (Munks-
gaard et al., 2000) although a small but growing literature 
focusses on the developing world where the dynamics are 
likely very different (see f.ex. Filippini & Pachauri (2004) 
for the use of household data in India). Much of this lit-
erature has focused on the relationship between house-
hold income and the adoption of specific energy-using 
consumer durables: Auffhammer & Wolfram (2014) 
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document S-shaped adoption curves for a number of 
appliances using province-level data in China while Ger-
tler et al. (2016) identifies such a relationship using mi-
cro-data from a Mexican conditional cash transfer pro-
gram. Davis & Gertler (2015) document a very strong 
link between income and adoption of air conditioners 
and predict a very rapid increase in related energy use 
in middle-income countries. These sector-specific stud-
ies provide support for the conclusion that the income 
elasticity of energy demand not only differs from unity 
but also varies by income level.
Taking a ‘macro’ economy-wide approach, Caron & Fally 
(2016) provide cross-country evidence that the income 
elasticity of most sectors of the economy varies signifi-
cantly from unity and is correlated with energy intensi-
ty in a way that affects energy intensities at the country 
level. However, in general the literature offers very little 
systematic ‘micro’-based evidence of the effect of shifts in 
consumption on total energy demand.
Only a small number of studies investigating consump-
tion patterns in China use micro data, due in part to the 
limited availability of household surveys in the country. 
One exception is China’s Urban Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey collected by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) which is exploited by Liang et al. (2014) 
to estimate the relationship between income and ener-
gy demand in an Almost-Ideal Demand System (AIDS) 
model. They provide strong evidence that income elas-
ticity varies across income groups, but do not estimate 
flexible Engel curves which span the full income spec-
trum. While the survey contains a large number of ob-
servations, it is limited to urban households in a limited 
number of provinces. As our objective is to estimate the 
national aggregate effect of income on energy consump-
tion, we require observations from a more diverse set of 
households and cannot rely on this survey. Despite this, 
income elasticity estimates in Liang et al. (2014) are gen-
erally comparable to ours, although their estimates for 
heat and gas are considerably higher (and above unity). 
Golley & Meng (2012) use the same survey and docu-
ment a strongly declining relationship between income 
and the direct household emissions intensity. They also 
combine survey data with input-output and emission 
coefficients, finding evidence for flat or even slightly 
increasing indirect emissions intensities (especially at 
high income levels). Other studies rely on aggregated 
data made available by the NBS for consumption across 
household types. Wei et al. (2007) for example document 
the relationship between energy use and lifestyles choic-
es, but do not link them to income.
Growing recognition of the empirical relevance of 
non-homothetic preferences has prompted a number 
of studies to move to flexible demand systems where 
income elasticity is allowed not only to differ from one 
but to vary systematically with income (in line with 
the Generalized Engels Law, as defined by Matsuyama 
(2016)). For example, Li et al. (2015) estimate an Exact 
Affine Stone Index (EASI) implicit Marshallian demand 
system (Lewbel & Pendakur, 2009) and document high-
rank non-linear Engel curves for several non-energy 
goods in China.
2.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
We begin with an overview of the data sets used and the 
procedure underlying our estimation of the income-con-
sumption relationship. The central idea behind both the 
estimation and our projections is to use household in-
come (and its projected growth) as a predictor of house-
hold consumption patterns. The data we rely on to esti-
mate this relationship are purely cross-sectional, so using 
these estimates as we do for projection assumes that 
preferences are identical across Chinese households and 
stable over time.2 
While we assume that households in all provinces will 
react in the same way to changes in income, expendi-
ture shares are allowed to vary according to a number 
of covariates including cooling and heating degree days, 
household size, and prices. Our estimation also allows 
for differences in urban and rural household behavior. As 
our estimates are based on cross-sectional variation, they 
have a long-term interpretation: the underlying assump-
tion is that households have had sufficient time to adapt 
all energy-consuming capital to their conditions (such as 
income, climate, or household size). Our methodology 
is thus best suited for mid- to long-term projection of 
consumption patterns, which is the primary focus of this 
exercise3.
We estimate the relationship between income and con-
sumption patterns separately for energy goods and 
non-energy goods. Consumption of energy goods, the 
main driver of results in this paper, is estimated using a 
household-level survey collected by Renmin University 
(Zheng et al., 2014). Known as the China Residential En-
ergy Consumption Survey (CRECS), the survey used to 
generate these data is based closely on the US Residential 
Energy Consumption Survey (EIA (Energy Information 
Administration, 2017). Household micro-data for China 
are scarce, and this energy-specific survey provides us 
with a detailed picture of the consumption of six types of 
energy goods i  ∈  I ^(CRECS ), which includes LPG, pipeline 
natural gas, gasoline and diesel, coal, central heating and 
2  We are not aware of any sufficiently long panel data set that 
would enable us to test this assumption.
3  As our approach based on contemporaneous income and 
consumption decisions, it does not however explicitly account for 
lifetime income.
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electricity by 4600 households h  ∈  H ^(CRECS ), representing 
a large income spectrum in both rural and urban areas 
and all provinces except for Tibet. Figure 1 plots the geo-
graphical distribution of sampled households. The sur-
vey was administered between 2012 and 2014.
A significant share of household energy use is indirect, 
meaning that it is embodied in the consumption of 
non-energy goods. To capture the relationship between 
income and indirect energy use, we also estimate similar 
Engel curves for the eight aggregate consumption cate-
gories compiled by the Chinese National Bureau of Sta-
tistics (NBS) (the same as used in Wei et al. (2007) and 
Dai et al. (2011)4). While average consumption statistics 
are not an ideal substitute for household-level data, the 
data describe the large variation in consumption patterns 
and income captured by 420 different types of represen-
tative households that cover all provinces, seven income 
classes per province, and urban/rural types. The sectoral 
aggregation, while coarse, captures the observed shifts in 
consumption from agriculture and basic manufacturing 
towards services and transportation.
2.3 Estimation
To estimate the drivers of household energy consump-
tion, we adjust each household h ’s nominal income I _(ihp ) 
by the Stone price index to obtain a measure of real in-
come which can be interpreted as ‘implicit utility’ in the 
4  These categories are: food, housing, transportation, medical, 
education, services, clothing, and furniture. This is the most detailed 
disaggregation available for all provinces and income classes. We use 
2012 statistics. The NBS does not make the raw survey data available, 
and we are not aware of any detailed consumption survey that covers 
households in all provinces and levels of income.
Exact Affine Stone Index (EASI) demand system (Lewbel 
& Pendakur, 2009):
where P _(ip ) represents the price of energy good i  in Chi-
nese province p  and θ_(ihp ) is good i ’s expenditure share. 
Price data for non-energy goods are unavailable and are 
approximated using consumer price indices for each 
province. As noted by Lewbel & Pendakur (2009), real 
income and nominal income are strongly correlated. Our 
main explanatory variable of interest is adjusted house-
hold income Ĩ _(ihp ), but we include a number of controls: 
household size HHS _(ihp ) and, at the provincial level, cool-
ing-and heating degree days, CDD _(p ) and HDD _(p ), and an 
indicator for being within the regions north of the Huai 
river where heating is required and available, HZ _(p ). All of 
the controls are at least partially correlated with income. 
For instance, richer provinces have cheaper electricity 
prices (in real terms). Underlying our estimation of the 
relationship between income and household energy de-
mand is a relationship between income and demand for 
energy services (cooking, heating, housing, transport, 
etc.). For our purposes, we do not separately estimate 
the determinants of energy services from those of actual 
energy use. For example, as households get richer, they 
might choose to live in a larger dwelling, which requires 
more energy to heat or cool. They might also choose to 
purchase a more energy-efficient heating or cooling sys-
tem. We are only interested in the combined effect. Thus, 
we do not control for any household-specific characteris-
tics such as dwelling size which may also be causally re-
lated to income. Given the small number of observations 
in some provinces, we do not include provincial fixed 
effects and simply pool our coefficients. Cross-provincial 
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of sampled households in household survey data (source: CRECS).
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variation in energy demand is captured by temperature 
and prices.
The survey data include a large number of zero-con-
sumption values, indicating that households do not nec-
essarily consume all energy goods. We thus estimate the 
relationship between income and consumption in two 
steps, separately estimating first the adoption rates for 
each energy type and then the intensive margin of energy 
use. In both steps, we remain agnostic about the shape of 
the income-consumption function and estimate flexible 
functional forms, which will allow for intrapolation with-
in the GE model. Equations used for the estimation are:  (1)
  
  (2)
where Equation (1) estimates the probability of adopting 
energy good i  using a probit model. ∀θ _(ihp ), Equation (2) 
estimates the conditional expenditure shares using OLS. 
ϵ 1_(ihp ),  ϵ 2_(ihp ) are residuals.5 The equations are estimated for 
each good i  ∈  I ^(CRECS ) and for urban and rural households 
separately.6 f  (.), g(.), h(.) and i(.) represent higher-or-
der polynomials, the best fitting combination of which 
is selected using the Akaike Information criterion (AIC). 
We allow polynomials of up to order six including log 
transformations and their polynomial transformations.7 
The second step estimation of the intensive margin close-
ly approximates the flexible EASI demand system, which 
5  The validity of our estimates depends on exogeneity of indepen-
dent variables in both steps [E(ϵ 1_(ihp )X _(ihp )  = 0 and E(ϵ 2_(ihp )X _(ihp )  = 0]. 
Exogeneity is clear for the temperature-related variables and plausible 
for the price variables, as these vary by province and not by household 
and are largely the product of government-regulated pricing in China 
and therefore unlikely to depend directly on demand. Thus, the most 
critical assumption here is that energy consumption choices do not af-
fect household income. Gertler et al. (2016) show that causality mainly 
goes from income to energy demand, suggesting that this assumption 
is reasonable. If energy usage did lead to larger incomes, our income 
elasticity estimates would be biased upward. Our findings imply low 
income elasticity. Correcting for endogeneity is expected to yield yet 
lower estimates.
6  Estimating the goods separately implies E(ϵ 1_(ihp )ϵ _(i ′hp )  = 0] for 
all pairs of goods i  and i ^(t ). The large number of zero-consumption 
values prevent us from imposing cross-restrictions on the coefficients. 
However, Lewbel & Pendakur (2009) show that this is an acceptable 
approximation. Indeed, we find that the sum of the fitted values of 
the expenditure shares is very close to 1, even without the restric-
tion, implying that the error terms are not significantly correlated 
across goods.
7  This is implemented using a multivariable fractional polynomial 
model that selects from all combinations of the variable and its log at 
powers -3, -2, -1, -0.5, 0.5, 1, 2 and 3. 
allows for full-rank demand (see Lewbel & Pendakur, 
2009) and is derived from utility-maximizing household 
behavior.8 This flexible functional form embeds standard 
demand systems such as AIDS —if f ̂ (I _(ihp )  is estimated 
as log(I _(ihp ) —or QUAIDS—if f ̂ (I _(ihp )  is estimated as log(I _(ihp ) +(log(I _(ihp ) ) ^2.
Income is found to be a significant determinant of de-
mand for all goods at a significance level of at least p=0.01, except for coal consumption by urban house-
holds, for which there are very few observations. As is 
common in studies using household survey data to esti-
mate demand systems, the R2 values are fairly low, rang-
ing from 0.08 for gasoline adoption—associated with 
automobile ownership—to 0.53 for adoption of pipeline 
gas by urban households for step 1; and ranging from 
0.06 for gasoline usage by rural households to 0.47 for 
coal usage by urban households for step 2. Using the esti-
mates from Equations (1) and (2), we obtain the predict-
ed probabilities of adoption for households of type u  ∈ 
{Urban, Rural}, P̂ r(I) _(iu ), and the predicted conditional 
expenditure shares for each good, θ̂ (I)_(iu ), as functions of 
a given income level I . Combining them provides esti-
mates of the predicted relationship between average ex-
penditure and income (Engel curves):9   (3)
These are displayed in Figure 2, evaluated at the mean 
of non-income covariates. We will refer to the average 
curves as Ê(I)iu ). The figure shows that while the in-
come-consumption paths are close to log-linear for some 
goods, non-linearity in most curves indicates that in-
come elasticity usually varies with income. As noted by 
Gertler et al. (2016), estimated curves based on aggregat-
ed energy demand from multiple energy-using assets is 
not necessarily S-shaped. Our estimates imply relatively 
low income elasticities, except for gasoline and diesel and 
central heating (particularly for rural households). Coal 
consumption decreases with income—particularly for 
urban households—implying negative income elasticity. 
The same holds for bottled gas at high income levels.
8  Lewbel & Pendakur (2009) show that the EASI demand system 
can be closely approximated with a linearized ordinary least-squares 
estimation. Because of our two-step estimation procedure and the 
significant number of zero- consumption observations in our dataset, 
the exact structural estimation of EASI is not possible with these data .
9  We implicitly assume no sample selection issues and no link be-
tween the first and second step [E(ϵ 1_(ihp )ϵ 2_(ihp )  = 0]. We find evidence 
that unobserved variables may affect both steps, i.e. the residuals for 
both steps are found to be significantly correlated for most goods. 
This would be a problem if we were interested in the effect of income 
on consumption for those who consume a particular good. However, 
here we are focused on average expenditure by households at each 
given income level. Thus we are not concerned about sample selection 
problems in the classical sense.
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The large heterogeneity in observed income levels in the 
CRECS data allows our projections to be in-sample to 
2030, as they cover a larger range of incomes than the 
projected average incomes in the general equilibrium 
model employed in our analysis.10 We of course acknowl-
edge that less is known about the expected behavior of 
the richest households and the prediction errors are an-
ticipated to be larger at high incomes.
The Engel curve estimation for non-energy goods (based 
on NBS data) is similar to that of energy goods, albe-
it without the first step as we observe full adoption of 
each consumption category. We also do not control for 
cross-province price differences because price indices for 
these consumption categories are unavailable, however, 
10  Average disposable household income in the model’s base year 
(2007) ranges from CNY 68128 for urban households in Shanghai 
to CNY 5292 for rural households in Sichuan. Between 2007 and the 
final year in consideration (2030), real income levels increase by a fac-
tor that varies between 6.9 (Inner Mongolia) and 3.7 (Xinjiang), due to 
different provincial growth rates (Projected provincial income growth 
rates from 2007 to 2030 range from annualized values of 8.8% to 
5.8%, with a national population-weighted average of 7.1%), bringing 
the highest household incomes in the model in 2030 to CNY 292072 
(urban households in Guangdong).
evidence suggests that relative price differences between 
provinces are small. The variation in incomes provided 
by the NBS data, which describe seven income classes 
per province, also allows our projections for non-energy 
goods to be within-sample to 2030.
3. General Equilibrium Model
While the above estimated Engel curves could be com-
bined directly with income growth projections to provide 
estimates of growth in energy demand, such an approach 
would implicitly assume perfectly elastic supply, exoge-
nous income levels, and would abstract from demand for 
energy as an intermediate in production. It would thus 
not capture the feedbacks from changing consumption 
patterns on prices through a realistic representation of 
supply, and on income, through changes in returns to 
factors of production (including the resource rents that, 
combined with demand, determine energy prices). It 
would also abstract from feedbacks on investment and 
patterns of trade, which are—in addition to household 
consumption—important sources of emissions, especial-
ly in China where trade contributes a large share of GDP. 
The consequences of climate policy should be assessed 
Figure 2. Estimated relationship between log household income and log energy expenditure (lines) and density of household 
incomes (histograms) for the sampled households from which estimates are derived (CRECS data density) and for households in the 
GE model for 2012 and 2030. left panel: urban households; Right panel: rural households. Average expenditure is evaluated at the 
mean of the non-income covariates.
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within a framework that captures these effects. This mo-
tivates our use of a general equilibrium model.
3.1 Existing Energy-Economic Modeling 
Approaches
3.1.1 The Income-Consumption Relationship
Studies focused specifically on projecting future demand 
for energy services and associated emissions are wide-
ly based on aggregate macro data, which, in contrast to 
studies that use micro household data, do not identify the 
relationship between income and consumption and do 
not take patterns of adoption into account. Many studies 
are based on time-series or panel reduced form projec-
tions. For China for example, Crompton & Wu (2005) 
project future energy demand based on GDP, population 
and fuel prices. Auffhammer & Carson (2008) project 
Chinese emissions based on provincial-level data.
Numerous economic models used for energy and climate 
policy analysis assume that consumption scales propor-
tionally with income, often for reasons of analytical or 
computational tractability and data limitations. Static 
analyses, including analytical general equilibrium models 
(Fullerton & Heutel, 2007; Fullerton & Monti, 2013) and 
computable general equilibrium models (Rausch et al., 
2011; Zhang et al., 2013) hold production technologies 
and preferences constant when comparing outcomes in 
the presence and absence of policy. While instructive for 
developing intuition, these models are not designed to 
capture dynamics. Dynamic models (e.g., Goettle et al., 
2009; Rausch et al., 2010a; Williams III et al., 2015), by 
contrast, allow underlying features of the economy to 
evolve over time and interact with policy. These features, 
which are often empirically calibrated, include labor 
and capital productivity (Dai et al., 2011), capital stock 
accumulation and depreciation (Goulder & Summers, 
1989), autonomous rates of energy efficiency improve-
ment (Webster et al., 2008), and a rich representation of 
advanced technologies that can enter the market in re-
sponse to policy (Jacoby et al., 2006). Most efforts have 
focused on the supply side, with little attention given to 
household preferences.
The models that do implement non-unitary income elas-
ticities usually do not use flexible demand systems, and 
while some employ energy-specific income elasticities, 
these are often based on simple calibration with no em-
pirical basis or on values that are extrapolated from oth-
er sectors. The GTAP model (Hertel, 1997; Aguiar et al., 
2016), for instance, adopts the Constant Difference of 
Elasticities (CDE) demand system originally proposed 
by Hanoch (1975) and is calibrated to internally-consis-
tent income elasticity estimates. These, however, are in-
dependent of the level of income and are estimated for 
broad consumption categories which do not separately 
identify energy. Other examples include MIT’s EPPA 
model (Chen et al., 2015), which calibrates Stone-Geary 
preferences to estimated income elasticities for the food 
and agricultural sectors only, the European Commis-
sion’s GEM-E3 model (Capros et al., 2013) which also 
calibrates Stone-Geary preferences to income-indepen-
dent estimates,11 and the World Bank’s ENVISAGE mod-
el, which incorporates a more flexible demand system, 
AIDADS, but relies on elasticity parameters that are only 
estimated for broad consumption categories and lump 
energy with other consumption goods (and imply im-
plausibly high income elasticities for energy12).
Finally, integrated assessment models (IAMs), which 
combine economic models with climate models and are 
used to evaluate climate change policies—and thus re-
quire the modeling of future energy use—typically de-
scribe the economy as a single sector. To the best of our 
knowledge, none of these models13 explicitly allow for 
endogenous de-carbonization driven via shifts in con-
sumption patterns (income-driven or not). In single-sec-
tor models, this mechanism is not otherwise distinguish-
able from supply-side determinants such as autonomous 
energy intensity improvements.
The present paper fills this gap by using micro data to 
estimate energy-specific income elasticities and integrate 
them within a general equilibrium economy-wide mod-
el. Our paper also contributes, to our knowledge, the first 
estimates of how income-dependent shifts in consump-
tion patterns affect climate policy costs and incidence.
3.1.2 Household Heterogeneity
Most models used for the evaluation of environmental or 
energy policy represent the demand side of the economy 
using a single representative household. This convention 
abstracts from the many ways that household heteroge-
neity can affect aggregate economic outcomes and their 
dynamics. Variation in the rates of household income 
growth, for example, may interact with heterogeneous 
consumption patterns in determining the composition of 
total household consumption. This issue is exacerbated 
when preferences are non-homothetic (as the consensus 
in the literature suggests) and income levels vary widely 
across households.
11  The authors do not document the source of the income elastici-
ties they employ, but the virtual lack of variation of the estimates for 
most energy goods across a wide range of countries (see the table on p. 
106 in Capros et al. (2013)) suggests that such estimates do not reflect 
relationships based on national-level household micro-data.
12  See Table A8.3 of van der Mensbrugghe (2010).
13  Examples of such models include the RICE/DICE (Nordhaus 
& Sztorc, 2013) model, Stanford’s MERGE (Manne & Richels, 2004) 
model and FEEM’s WITCH (Bosetti et al., 2004) model. 
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The representative household approach also does not 
enable a consistent evaluation of the distribution of eco-
nomic burden caused by policy. We build on recent work 
to incorporate heterogeneous households into general 
equilibrium models for incidence analysis (Rausch et al., 
2010a,b, 2011; Rausch & Schwarz, 2016), which allows us 
to distinguish how the impacts of policy are distributed 
across household types.
3.2 Model Features
Our general equilibrium modeling framework extends 
the China Regional and Energy Model (C-REM), a 
multi-region, multi-sector, recursive-dynamic global 
computable general equilibrium model with sub-na-
tional detail in China. Our model builds on Zhang et al. 
(2013) and Luo et al. (2016).14 The model describes all 30 
Chinese provinces, four international regions (the Unit-
ed States, Europe, other developing countries, and other 
developed countries), 13 sectors of the economy, includ-
ing 5 energy goods and an energy-intensive industry sec-
tor, and 2 household types for the 2007 to 2030 period. 
The regional, sectoral and household aggregation scheme 
is shown in Table C1 in the Appendix. The model satis-
fies standard neoclassical assumptions, with households 
maximizing welfare for given incomes (derived from 
factors of production, taxes and government transfers) 
at given consumption prices, firms maximizing profits 
in perfectly competitive markets, subject to government 
taxation, and a government raising taxes to meet its bud-
get. Starting from a benchmark year, a set of technology 
assumptions, and a trajectory for labor productivity that 
determines GDP growth, the model solves for a series of 
equilibria at given time intervals.
Households are characterized by myopic expectations, 
and their behavior is thus optimal within, but not be-
tween, periods. Households are assumed to derive utility 
from savings, in addition to consumption and leisure. We 
do not consider the households preference for pollution 
(emissions) abatement.
Within time periods, household utility is represented as a 
nested function. At the top level, a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function describes substitution between consumption, 
leisure and savings. This generates a positive labor sup-
ply elasticity through the labor-leisure trade-off. At the 
lower level, utility from consumption is represented by 
a Stone-Geary function of the individual consumption 
goods. For household type h̅  ∈  H in region r  ∈  R  at 
14  Zhang et al. (2013) first presented the static version of C-REM, 
and Luo et al. (2016) developed a recursive-dynamic extension.
time t  utility from consumption is thus assumed to be of 
the following form:15   (4) 
where c_(j h̅ rt ) is the minimum level of required consump-
tion of good j  ∈  J  represented within the model, p _(jrt0 ) 
the benchmark price, x _(j h̅ rt0 ) the benchmark consumption 
level, and I _(h̅ rt0 ) the benchmark income level, net of sav-
ings and leisure consumption. θ̃_(j h̅ rt ) is the consumption 
share net of minimum consumption and ρ parametrizes 
the response of consumption to changes in relative prices.
Production of good j  in region r  (Y _(jr )  is assumed to ex-
hibit constant returns to scale, with nested constant-elas-
ticity-of-substitution (CES) functions representing 
differential substitution among inputs of intermediate 
goods (X _(jkr ) , and productive factors capital (K _(jr ) , labor 
(L _(jr )  and natural resources (R _(jr ) , comprising land, fossil 
fuel, wind and hydropower resources:  (5)
The nesting structure for each sectors’ production func-
tion is expounded in Appendix C. Trade in goods and 
services is determined according to the Armington as-
sumption of differentiated products by origin. With-
in China, labor is assumed to be mobile across sectors 
but not provinces, and capital is assumed to be mobile 
across both sectors and provinces. Outside China, both 
labor and capital are assumed to be immobile between 
regions. In both cases, natural resources are modeled as 
sector-specific factors.
Appendix C provides a detailed description of the econ-
omy’s equilibrium conditions. The equilibrium is deter-
mined numerically by formulating a mixed complemen-
tarity problem (MCP) (Mathiesen, 1985; Rutherford, 
1995), which is solved using the mathematical program-
ming system MPSGE (Rutherford, 1999) and the PATH 
solver (Dirkse & Ferris, 1995).
Between periods, growth in region r ’s labor endowment 
(L̅ _(r )  is driven by the combination of population growth 
and labor productivity growth. Capital stock dynamics 
(K̅ _(rt )  are determined by the accumulation of new capital 
through investment (Y _(INV,rt ) , which amounts to aggre-
15  In the model, household utility from consumption is nest-
ed, as discussed in Appendix C . For simplicity, we abstract here 
from nesting.
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gate household savings, and by the depreciation of exist-
ing capital:  (6)  (7)
where δ  is the depreciation rate, and g _(rt ) is the sum of the 
population and the labor productivity growth rates.
Fossil fuel resources in each period are depleted to ac-
count for fossil fuel consumption in the previous period. 
Other sector-specific resources are assumed to grow at an 
exogenous rate. We furthermore assume energy efficiency 
to improve over time independently of changes in relative 
prices, through long-run autonomous energy efficiency 
improvement (AEEI) (Paltsev et al., 2005).
3.3 Calibration
Starting from the base year (the calibration of which is de-
scribed in Section 3.3.1 below), the economy’s evolution 
is determined by recursively updating economic variables 
as described in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Base Year Calibration
Sub-national detail in China is parametrized using the 
set of 2007 provincial input-output tables and provincial 
energy balance tables made available by the National Bu-
reau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (NBS) 
(2008, 2011). Each province comprises a representative 
urban and rural household, h̅  ∈  {Urban, Rural}, calibrat-
ed to provincial-level urban and rural consumption data. 
While household types likely also differ with respect to 
the sources from which they derive income, lack of data 
forces us to assume the composition of income for each 
household to be identical to the provincial average.
International regions are comprised of a single represen-
tative household. Economic and energy data as well as 
trade flows among all regions are parametrized using the 
GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) data base version 8 
(Narayanan et al., 2012).
Calibration of the substitution elasticities in the mod-
el’s production functions is based on the MIT Emissions 
Projection and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model (Palt-
sev et al., 2005): substitution between capital and labor is 
Cobb-Douglas; a value of 0.5 is assumed for both the elas-
ticity of substitution between electricity and the fossil fuels 
composite, and between the value added and the energy 
composites in production. Following Caron et al. (2015), 
Armington trade elasticities are calibrated using estimates 
from GTAP, but the relative values of domestic and inter-
national elasticities are adjusted such that, in China, goods 
from other provinces are seen as closer substitutes to local 
(i.e. from within the province) goods than internationally 
sourced goods, which generates a border effect.
3.3.2 Dynamic Calibration
Starting from the base year 2007, we run our model to 
generate projections for 2010, 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030.
The initial population growth rate in China is assumed 
to equal 0.5% per year (United Nations, 2011). The initial 
labor productivity growth rate is calibrated such that it 
reproduces observed provincial economic growth rates 
between 2007 and 2010. Similar to Paltsev et al. (2005), 
we then assume an S-shaped evolution from the initial 
growth rate to the long-term steady state:  (8)
where g _(rT ) is the long-term (100 years) growth rate, as-
sumed to be 2% per year. We set the values of α  and β  to 
0.3 and 0.1. We assume the growth rate of land resources 
to be 2% per year. The savings rate is calibrated to base 
year data.
Physical energy quantities are obtained by province by first 
calibrating the model to observed economic growth, then 
adjusting energy efficiency to match 2010 observations for 
energy quantities based on National Bureau of Statistics of 
the People’s Republic of China (NBS) (2012). The long-run 
autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI) for all 
sectors is assumed to be approximately 2% per year in Chi-
nese provinces (Cao & Ho, 2010) and about 1% per year 
outside of China. In order to isolate the role of changing 
household consumption patterns, we assume no energy 
efficiency improvements on the part of households.
3.3.3 Income-Dependent Consumption Patterns
Our main methodological contribution is an approach 
to capture income-dependent consumption patterns in a 
recursive-dynamic general equilibrium model, based on 
a hybrid demand system. The approach stems from the 
observation that changes in income in this class of mod-
els are primarily driven by productivity growth between 
periods whereas the within-period changes in income 
(due to energy or climate policies, for instance) are com-
paratively small. Allowing for flexibility in the shape of 
income-consumption relationships is thus most import-
ant for between-period changes. Our approach is further-
more based on the assumption that consumer behavior 
is myopic.16 It allows us to calibrate the model to any em-
pirically-estimated consumption path as a function of be-
tween-period changes in income. For a fixed set of relative 
prices, household expenditure shares follow the estimated 
Engel curves as income increases between periods. With-
in-period changes in income are captured by the Stone-
16  It should be noted that our approach would not be suited for ra-
tional expectations models, as in our framework preference parameters 
are updated between model periods, and are thus not fixed in time.
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Geary demand system, which is appropriate for captur-
ing the effect of comparatively small changes in income.17 
For households within China, we proceed as follows.18 
First, we obtain the income of households of type u  in 
province p  at time t(I _(upt )  at benchmark prices, net of 
savings and demand for leisure. For this, we run the 
model with homothetic preferences (i.e., with minimum 
consumption parameters c_(jupt ) set to zero), and divide 
nominal income levels by each consumer’s price index. 
Second, we project consumption at benchmark prices for 
each good j, time t, household type u and province p, in 
order to follow the estimated income-expenditure rela-
tionships. The aggregation of goods in the GE model dif-
fers from that of the data used for estimation described in 
Section 2. As is usually the case, aggregation schemes from 
input-output tables do not match those of consumption 
data derived from household surveys. We thus map the 
relationships between income and expenditure estimated 
in Equation (3) (Ê(I)_(ju)  to corresponding relationships for 
goods in the GE model (Ê(I)_(ju) . Some goods in the model 
are composites of goods used for the estimation.
The Engel curve for natural gas (GAS), for example, is 
constructed by aggregating the estimated curves for bot-
tled gas (LPG) and pipeline natural gas. Other goods in 
the model map directly, such as the agricultural sector 
(AGR), for which the Engel curve corresponds to the es-
timated curve for food.19 
We use the Engel curves Ê(I)_(ju ) to look up the expen-
ditures corresponding to the level of household income: Ê(I _(upt ) _(ju ). We then compute the proportional change in 
consumption for each good, and scale the level of bench-
mark consumption, x _(jupt0 ), by this factor. This delivers the 
demand projections y _(jupt ) at benchmark prices:  (9)
17  Chen et al. (2015) also employ an iterative calibration procedure 
for Stone-Geary preferences. Our approach, however, differs signifi-
cantly, as we target flexible Engel curves (which could be based on any 
functional form), rather than point estimates of income elasticities, 
and we account for the effect of the preference calibration on real 
household income levels. The scope of our application also differs 
greatly, as we target a wide range of goods, while (Chen et al., 2015) 
calibrate income elasticities for food and agricultural products only.
18  Outside China, preferences are assumed to be homothetic. The 
corresponding minimum consumption levels are thus assumed to be 
zero (i.e., c_(j h̅ rt ) for all regions r  outside China).
19  There are some sectors for which we cannot construct a cor-
responding Engel curve based on our estimates. This concerns four 
of the twelve goods in the GE model which are primarily used as 
intermediate goods (CRU, OMN, EIS and WTR). For these goods, 
household consumption is very small and we assume it to scale in 
proportion to income. 
Third, we calibrate consumer preferences such that at the 
level of income I _(upt ) and benchmark prices, consump-
tion for each good j  is equal to the projected (empiri-
cally-grounded) level y _(jupt ). The proposition below shows 
that Stone-Geary preferences can indeed be calibrated 
in this way.
Proposition. Assume t  > t _(0 ). The following calibration 
ensures that at benchmark prices and at the income pre-
vailing at time t , I _(upt ), the consumption of each good cor-
responds to the projections based on the estimated Engel 
curves, y _(jupt ):  (10)
Proof. At benchmark prices, the demand function for 
good j  by household u  in province p  at time t  is given by  (11)
Since � _(j )p _(jpt0 )y _(jupt ) = I _(upt ), the following holds for the c_(jupt ), from (10): � _(j )p _(jpt0 )c_(jupt ) = 0. For this calibration, 
the subsistence consumption parameters at benchmark 
prices sum to zero in any given period, since household 
expenditure across all goods equals income. We use this 
to simplify Equation (11):
 , 
then insert Equation (10), thus obtaining the following 
equality: x _(jupt )(p _(pt0 ), I  ≡ I _(upt )  = y _(jupt )
Fourth, we run the model with the newly calibrated pref-
erences, obtaining new real income levels I ′_(upt ).  These are 
not generally equal to initial income (i.e., I ′_(upt ) ≠  I _(upt ) , 
both because the same prices and nominal income levels 
correspond to different levels of real income for different 
utility functions, and because different preferences will 
lead to a different market equilibrium, influencing prices 
and income. We therefore re-calibrate household prefer-
ences following steps two and three above, and re-run 
the model iteratively until real income has converged.20 
The resulting preferences are such that, at the levels of 
real income at a given time t  and for benchmark prices, 
consumption levels correspond exactly to the projections 
based on the estimated Engel curves.
The use of Stone-Geary preferences in our hybrid ap-
proach is motivated by the fact that implementation 
within a general equilibrium model is simple and deliv-
20  Convergence in our specific case is achieved after four iterations, 
as detailed in Appendix A.
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ers an approximation of the local properties of the Engel 
curve estimates. Additionally, since proportional chang-
es in utility levels are equivalent—in welfare terms—to 
proportional changes in income at benchmark prices21 
(as our calibration ensures that � _(j )p _(jpt0 )c_(jupt ) = 0), our 
approach provides a metric to consistently evaluate the 
welfare impact of policy shocks across periods.
4. Baseline Projection
We first summarize the effect of income-driven chang-
es in consumption patterns on baseline projections of 
economic activity, energy use, and emissions. In order 
to isolate the role of these changes, we compare the re-
sults for calibrated non-homothetic preferences (which 
we will refer to as the Calibrated case) and the results for 
an alternative counterfactual case in which preferences 
are assumed to be homothetic.22 We refer to this counter-
factual as the Proportional case, since homothetic prefer-
ences imply proportional income-consumption relation-
ships for all goods.
4.1 Composition of Household Consumption
Table 1 displays the composition of household consump-
tion at the national level, both in the base year and in 
the final year of our simulation, 2030. In the proportion-
al case, the average expenditure shares on energy goods 
as well as on agricultural goods increase over time. This 
indicates that the effect of rising energy prices, driven by 
the depletion of fossil fuel reserves, and rising agricul-
tural goods prices, caused by the relative scarcity of land, 
outweighs the effect of substitution away from these in-
creasingly expensive goods. Accounting for the empiri-
cally calibrated income-expenditure relationships revers-
es this trend, both for agricultural goods as well as for all 
energy goods with the exception of oil. While the average 
consumption share of oil in the final year is higher than 
in the base year, it is nonetheless lower than in the pro-
portional baseline. Noteworthy for models that capture 
only price effects, our results illustrate that income-driv-
en shifts away from energy and agricultural goods have a 
stronger effect on consumption patterns than price-driv-
en effects, due to the low income elasticities for these 
goods and the rapid growth in household income levels.
Manufacturing, transportation, and services represent a 
roughly constant share of average household consump-
tion under homothetic preferences, as they see modest 
fluctuations in prices. However, the calibrated non-ho-
21  Equivalently, proportional changes in utility levels correspond 
to the equivalent variation at benchmark prices, divided by bench-
mark income. 
22  This corresponds to the case with minimum consumption 
parameters c_(j h̅ rt ) set to zero, implying within-period CES preferences 
calibrated to shares that remain unchanged between periods. 
mothetic preference projection shows manufacturing 
shrinking in relative importance within household 
consumption baskets, while the average share of ser-
vices strongly increases and that of transportation more 
than doubles.
Table 1 also shows that in the proportional case, the stan-
dard deviation (across provinces and household types) of 
the expenditure shares of energy and agricultural goods 
increase in time, as differences between households 
are magnified by the increase in prices, while for other 
goods the values are roughly constant. The variation in 
household expenditure shares thus increases on average, 
suggesting divergence in relative consumption baskets 
across households.
The story is different in the calibrated case: the standard 
deviation in expenditure shares is lower for most goods, 
with the notable exception of transportation and ser-
vices. It is therefore not clear a priori if changes in the 
composition of consumption driven by rising incomes 
will lead to a divergence or a convergence in the ener-
gy and emissions-intensity of consumption baskets and 
therefore in the distribution of welfare impacts caused 
by climate policy-driven changes in relative prices. We 
investigate this question later in the paper.
4.2 Energy Use and Emissions
Table 2 displays China’s demand for each energy type, in 
2007 and in 2030, for both the calibrated and proportion-
al cases. In the calibrated case, direct household demand 
for energy is dramatically reduced compared to the pro-
portional case. The relative reduction in total national 
demand for energy is smaller since household demand 
for energy only represents a fraction of national demand, 
which also includes intermediate demand (a substantial 
part of which goes to exports), government, and invest-
ment demand, all of which are particularly high in China.
Total household consumption of coal in 2030 is projected 
to be lower than its base year value, as expected given 
that its Engel curve estimates suggest it to be an inferior 
good for all but the poorest rural households, and is 81% 
lower compared to projected consumption in 2030 with 
homothetic preferences. The least affected energy good, 
refined oil, sees its household demand reduced by ap-
proximately 5% relative to the baseline projection. Over-
all, household demand for energy in 2030 is 58% lower 
than in the proportional case. National energy demand 
is 6% lower.
Changes in household energy demand by type between 
the proportional and calibrated cases do not translate di-
rectly to changes in national demand because of a num-
ber of general equilibrium effects.
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First, lower demand on the part of households depress-
es prices for most energy goods, causing an increase in 
the intermediate demand from the other sectors (which 
use energy goods as inputs). This mitigates the effect of 
income-driven consumption shifts. Exports are also af-
fected, but to a lesser extent.
Second, changes in demand for non-energy goods affect 
demand for energy goods as production inputs. In ad-
dition to direct household use in privately-owned vehi-
cles, refined oil is an input to purchased ground and air 
transportation, which experiences a doubling in its share 
of household consumption between 2007 and 2030. Al-
though direct household demand for oil is slightly re-
duced by the consumption shift relative to the propor-
tional case, the national demand for oil is higher due to 
higher indirect household demand. This is also reflected 
in the price of oil, which increases slightly in the cali-
brated case.
Changes in the household consumption of energy and 
non-energy goods affect the levels of CO2 emissions in 
the Chinese economy, both directly through emissions 
caused by the burning of fossil fuels and the consump-
tion of electricity at the household level23, and indirect-
ly through changes in the composition of production to 
satisfy changing consumer preferences for non-energy 
goods. Table 3 summarizes these changes. In 2030, di-
rect household CO2 emissions are lower by 1.67 billion 
tons as a result of reduced household consumption of 
23  We follow most of the literature here and include electricity-relat-
ed emissions in direct household emissions. 
fossil fuels and electricity, a 61% reduction compared to 
the homothetic case. National CO2 emissions in the final 
year are roughly 8% lower compared to the proportional 
case, corresponding to a reduction of 1.22 billion tons of 
CO2 emissions—an amount just slightly larger than Ja-
pan’s emissions in 2011. We note also that the difference 
between direct household and total emissions, explained 
by the important shares of government, investment and 
export-related emissions, are exceptionally large in Chi-
na (and that household emissions likely have a greater 
influence on total emissions in most other countries).
5. Policy Analysis
We now study the interaction between income-driven 
changes in the composition of household consumption 
and climate policy. We design a simple stylized policy 
which reflects current policy proposals. We consider a 
set of national CO2 emissions targets, implemented by 
an economy-wide national CO2 price. As above, we com-
pare the outcomes of the proportional and calibrated cas-
es under this policy.
By design, we choose emissions levels under policy to be 
identical in both cases. This allows a direct comparison 
of the costs of achieving a fixed environmental outcome. 
Since baseline emissions are lower in the calibrated case, 
the absolute emissions reductions will be lower than 
with homothetic preferences. Income-driven shifts in 
the composition of household consumption thus directly 
affect the stringency of the climate policy.
Figure 3 illustrates baseline emissions for the calibrated 
and proportional cases, as well as the targeted emissions 
Figure 3. National CO2 emissions for baseline and policy, for homothetic and for non-homothetic preferences.
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Table 1. Baseline household expenditure share by good (% of total consumption)
Average Standard deviation
2007 2030 2007 2030
Preferences: Proportional Calibrated Proportional Calibrated
COL 1.0 1.4 0.3 1.1 1.6 0.5
GAS 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.2
OIL 2.1 3.1 2.9 1.6 2.5 2.3
ELE 3.4 3.5 1.2 2.1 2.2 0.8
AGR 15.3 17.2 12.6 8.6 9.4 7.7
MAN 32.1 31.0 24.4 8.5 8.3 7.0
TRN 2.6 2.6 6.1 1.2 1.2 2.9
SER 35.6 33.7 43.6 8.5 8.5 9.8
Notes: Averages and standard deviations computed across provinces and household types (urban/rural), weighted by population.
Table 2. Baseline national and household-level demand for (secondary) energy by energy type
Quantity Price index
Household demand National demand
2007 2030 2007 2030 2030
Prefs.: Prop. Calib. Diff. Prop. Calib. Diff. Prop. Calib. Diff.
COL 77 303 58 -81.0% 836 2332 2215 -5.0% 1.57 1.43 -8.5%
GAS 15 69 24 -65.2% 72 292 259 -11.4% 1.13 1.05 -6.7%
OIL 46 180 170 -5.5% 504 1183 1209 +2.2% 1.72 1.73 +0.6%
ELE 73 366 135 -63.1% 519 1816 1599 -12.0% 0.91 0.88 -3.0%
Notes: units: Mtce (Quantity); prices relative to 2007 levels (Price index). Note that COl, GAS, and OIl data excludes demand from 
the electricity sector for these inputs to avoid double counting. Price index constructed as an average of regional prices relative to 
benchmark, weighted by provincial energy consumption for each energy type.
Table 3. Baseline national and household-level emissions (Billion tons CO2/year)
Direct household emissions National emissions
Preferences: Proportional Calibrated Difference Proportional Calibrated Difference
2007 0.8 0.8 0.0% 6.4 6.4 0.0%
2010 1.0 0.8 -19.7% 7.7 7.5 -2.3%
2015 1.4 0.8 -38.4% 10.0 9.5 -4.9%
2020 1.9 0.9 -50.1% 12.7 11.9 -6.4%
2025 2.3 1.0 -56.5% 14.8 13.7 -7.2%
2030 2.7 1.1 -60.8 % 16.3 15.0 -7.5%
Notes: Direct household emissions comprise emissions from the domestic combustion of fossil fuels, as well as the emissions em-
bodied in electricity consumed by households.
REPORT 314 MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND POlICy OF GlOBAl CHANGE
14
path under policy. The CO2 emissions targets (displayed 
in Table 4 as Emissions targets) correspond to an emis-
sions trajectory that results from simulating a 4% year-
ly reduction in CO2 intensity in the proportional case, 
consistent with current target emissions paths aiming to 
achieve a CO2 emissions plateau by 2030 (Zhang et al., 
2016b). This policy only targets fossil fuel-based CO2 
emissions, such that the results of the following sections 
can be considered similar to those of a policy that targets 
energy use (associated with other externalities such as lo-
cal air pollution) directly.
The allocation of the revenues generated by carbon pric-
ing has important consequences for incidence. In our 
analysis, unless specified otherwise, we consider a re-
distribution scheme in which the revenue is returned to 
households in each province in lump sums proportional 
to baseline income. Such revenue recycling does not af-
fect the distribution of income, shutting off this channel 
of incidence and keeping the focus on the impact of dif-
ferences in household preferences on welfare. 
5.1 Energy Use and Emissions Reductions, 
Carbon Prices, and Average Policy Impacts
The policy significantly affects energy use, as can be 
seen from Figure 4. Focusing on the results for calibrat-
ed preferences, we find that primary energy demand in 
2030 is reduced by 28% relative to the baseline. Under 
the policy, coal use peaks around 2025, while energy con-
sumption from oil, gas and renewable sources continues 
to increase, albeit from a smaller base. By comparing the 
28% reduction in primary energy to the 30% reduction 
in CO2 emissions in the policy against the baseline pro-
jection, we find that substitution away from energy use 
rather than substitution among energy sources is the 
main driving factor in the overall reduction of carbon 
emissions in our simulations.
Table 4 reports the effect of climate policy on national 
emissions, as well as the associated carbon price and pol-
icy impacts. Importantly, the reduced stringency of pol-
icy under calibrated preferences, due to the lower base-
Figure 4. Primary energy by energy source for calibrated preferences under policy.
Table 4. The effect of climate policy on national emissions, the associated carbon price, average consumption loss and average 
provincial GDP loss: comparison of calibrated non-homothetic (calib.) and proportional homothetic (prop.) preferences.
Emissions Policy impacts
Targets Reductions Price Consumption loss Provincial GDP loss
Prefs.: Calib. Prop. Calib. Prop. Calib. Prop. Calib. Prop.
2015 8.9 0.6 1.1 8.1 16.0 0.3% 0.9% 0.4% 0.7%
2020 10.0 1.9 2.7 26.9 42.7 1.1% 2.6% 1.4% 1.8%
2025 10.4 3.3 4.3 49.5 74.3 2.0% 4.6% 2.6% 3.1%
2030 10.5 4.6 5.8 72.7 111.7 2.9% 6.3% 3.5% 3.9%
Notes: units: Emissions: Billion tons CO2/year. Price: uSD per ton of CO2. Averages are weighted by population. Here and elsewhere 
in the paper, an exchange rate of 7.6 CNy per uSD has been applied (2007 average).
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line emissions, translates to a 35% lower carbon price24 in 
2030. We measure welfare impacts (expressed as equiva-
lent variation relative to real income) in terms of changes 
in welfare from consumption and will thus also simply 
refer to it as consumption loss.25 Assuming a 4% annual 
discount rate, the net present value of the total consump-
tion loss to 2030, accounting for the recycled revenue, 
amounts to 395 billion 2007 USD for the calibrated case. 
Cumulative emissions reductions amount to 43 billion 
tons of CO2. The average welfare cost thus amounts to 9.2 
USD per ton abated. In the proportional case, the cost 
is 17.8 USD per ton abated, reflecting rapidly increasing 
marginal abatement costs.26 
The average provincial consumption and GDP losses 
under policy, for each period following the implemen-
tation of the policy, as reported in Table 427, show that 
ignoring income-driven shifts substantially overesti-
mates the average costs of reaching a given emissions 
trajectory: higher baseline emissions in the proportional 
case lead to an implicitly more stringent and therefore 
more costly policy. The estimated Engel curves thus im-
ply that income growth drives a shift away from energy 
goods and reduces the CO2 intensity of household con-
sumption, such that households are less exposed to the 
carbon price. It is important to note that welfare costs 
in the proportional case are more strongly overestimat-
ed compared to GDP costs: the consumption shift has a 
larger mitigating effect on the CO2 intensity of household 
consumption than on other components of GDP, so the 
CO2 price generates larger differences between the cal-
ibrated and proportional cases in household consumer 
price indices than in the economy-wide price index. As a 
consequence, nominal income losses translate into larger 
24  This is the shadow price of the model’s carbon constraint.
25  We report the loss in utility from consumption rather than loss in 
total utility, which in the model also includes utility from leisure and 
savings. These are introduced into utility to generate positive with-
in-period labor and capital supply elasticities, and their contribution 
to welfare is thus arbitrary. Another possible measure of household 
welfare would include government expenditures. We find that both 
the patterns of incidence and the effect of our preference calibration 
on the distribution of impacts reported in the following sections are 
robust to the use of such alternative measures of household welfare.
26  For comparison, Rausch & Karplus (2014), also using a 4% 
discount rate, find for the US that cumulative CO2 reductions of 50 
billion tons by 2050 result in 2005 net present welfare costs of approx-
imately 5 USD per ton. For 100 billion tons of cumulative reductions, 
they find welfare costs of roughly 15 USD per ton.
27  Both the consumption loss and the average provincial GDP loss 
are weighted by population. We consider average provincial GDP loss 
rather than national GDP loss, in order to make it more comparable 
with the loss in house- hold welfare from consumption. Since house-
hold incomes differ across provinces and household types, population 
weighted % changes differ from the % changes in the totals.
differences in welfare compared to GDP.28 This is import-
ant because household welfare, not GDP, should arguably 
be the metric of greater interest to policy makers.
5.2 Distributional Impacts of Policy
We now focus on the policy’s distribution of impacts 
across household types, defined here by province and ur-
ban/rural status. We start by describing the distribution 
of welfare impacts. Section 5.2.1 will then highlight the 
drivers of these results, based on a welfare decomposi-
tion. Section 5.2.4 will finally identify the reasons for the 
differences in the distributional results between calibrat-
ed and proportional cases.
We first describe the distribution of welfare impacts by 
pooling households into subgroups, allowing differentia-
tion along various policy-relevant dimensions. We focus 
first on average consumption loss within subgroups in 
the calibrated preferences case. We then compare results 
to outcomes with homothetic preferences (proportional 
case). Results are displayed in Table 5.
Under our assumption of income-proportional redis-
tribution of CO2 pricing revenues, we find that rural 
households are on average more negatively affected than 
urban households; households in low income provinces 
are more affected than households in medium and high 
income provinces (as can also be seen for average pro-
vincial-level impacts in the left panel of Figure 5); house-
holds in provinces with high coal production are more 
affected than households in provinces with low coal pro-
duction. From the right panel of Figure 5, we can also see 
that households in provinces with a high carbon intensi-
ty of GDP are impacted more strongly. The geographic 
distribution of impacts also varies widely (as can also be 
seen from Figure 6): Western provinces suffer the most, 
Eastern provinces the least, with Central provinces (with 
the exception of Shanxi, a major coal producer and ex-
porter, which is highly affected) falling in between.
As an aside, we also investigate sensitivity to redistrib-
uting the CO2 price revenue proportional to provincial 
emissions rather than household income. Results are re-
ported in the middle columns of Table 5. The difference 
in welfare impacts between relative winners and losers 
generally decreases, as provinces with high emissions in-
tensity of GDP, which tend to be more negatively affect-
ed by the policy, benefit from a higher share of revenues 
from the carbon price.
28  It should be noted that this would still hold if household con-
sumption were also subject to an AEEI, as the
consumption shift would still have a much larger mitigating effect 
on the CO2 intensity of household consumption than on the average 
intensity of GDP. This would also hold if the economy-wide AEEI 
were zero. The quantitative results in these two alternate cases would, 
naturally, differ.
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Figure 5. Relationship between consumption loss in 2030 and base-year household disposable income / carbon intensity of GDP for 
calibrated preferences and income-proportional revenue redistribution.
Table 5. % consumption loss with respect to the baseline for calibrated non-homothetic versus proportional pref- erences and 
alternative redistribution schemes of revenues from CO2 pricing, population-weighted average values (standard deviations in 
brackets), with households divided into subsets
Preferences: Calibrated Proportional
Redistribution: Income-proportional Emission-proportional Income-proportional
2015 2030 2015 2030 2015 2030
All households 0.3 2.9 0.3 2.6 0.9 6.3
(1.0) (5.1) (0.5) (2.9) (2.0) (8.1)
Urban 0.2 2.3 0.1 2.2 0.7 5.0
Rural 0.4 3.4 0.4 3.0 1.2 7.5
East 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.3 2.9
Central 0.6 4.6 0.5 4.2 1.5 9.0
Central* 0.3 2.9 0.4 3.5 0.9 6.7
West 0.5 4.1 0.4 3.5 1.3 8.2
Low coal production -0.3 0.0 0.0 1.9 -0.4 0.9
Medium coal production 0.3 2.8 0.2 2.2 1.0 6.6
High coal production 2.7 15.9 1.5 9.3 5.8 26.8
High income 0.1 1.9 0.1 2.0 0.5 4.4
Medium income 0.2 2.2 0.1 1.8 0.8 5.5
Low income 0.6 4.5 0.5 4.1 1.5 9.0
Notes: Coal production: High (above 5 % value of base year output from COl), low (below 1 % value of base year output from COl). 
Eastern provinces: BJ, FJ, GD, HI, HE, JS, lN, SD, SH, TJ, ZJ; Central provinces: AH, Hl, HA, HN, HB, JX, Jl, NM, SX; Western prov-
inces: CQ, GS, GX, GZ, NX, QH, SN, SC, XJ, yN. Central*: without SX.
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Compared to calibrated preferences, average consump-
tion losses in the proportional case are more pronounced 
in almost all of the subgroups considered. Importantly, 
the difference in impacts among subgroups is also larger. 
As an example, low income households in the calibrated 
case suffer consumption loss which is 2.6% higher than 
high income households in 2030 (4.5% against 1.9%) in-
stead of 4.6% in the proportional case.
Turning to the distribution of these losses across all 
households, as can be seen on the second line of Table 
5, standard deviations increase in time in all cases, as the 
increasing stringency of the climate policy magnifies rel-
ative differences among household types and provinces. 
For a given year, the variation of impacts is reduced under 
the emissions-based allocation of carbon price revenues, 
confirming that this alternative redistribution scheme is 
more neutral. Standard deviations in the calibrated case 
are lower than in the proportional case, implying that—
compared to an incidence analysis that would abstract 
from the income-driven consumption shifts—the varia-
tion of welfare impacts is lower.
Figure 7 displays the impacts of policy across the full 
set of urban and rural representative households for all 
provinces, in 2015 and 2030. In both years, under cali-
brated preferences, the figure shows that the average con-
sumption loss is not only lower, but that losses exhibit 
Figure 6. Geographic distribution of % consumption loss in 2030 for calibrated preferences and income-proportional revenue 
redistribution.
Figure 7. Population-weighted distribution of welfare impacts (across provinces and urban/rural types) of policy for calibrated and 
proportional preferences.
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less variation across subgroups. The following sections 
further unpack these results.
5.2.1 Decomposing Variation in Welfare Impacts
The welfare results displayed so far are general equilibri-
um estimates and correspond to the equivalent variation 
associated with changes in utility from consumption, 
relative to real baseline income. In order to identify the 
drivers of variation in welfare impacts, we perform an 
ex post decomposition which approximates equivalent 
variation using the change in consumer surplus caused 
by changes in prices, quantities consumed and income, 
as in West & Williams III (2004). We then measure the 
contribution of each of these components to the varia-
tion in impacts across households under both preference 
calibrations.
Similarly to Williams III et al. (2015), we assume the 
demand curve to be linear in the relevant range such 
that the change in consumer surplus relative to income 
is given by:  (12)
where province and household indices are sup-
pressed for simplicity, ∆I = I^(Policy)-I, with I the 
baseline income (net of savings and leisure con-
sumption) and I^(Policy) the income under the pol-
icy, θ _(j) =  the baseline expenditure share on 
good j,  the proportional change in the price 
of good i  and  the proportional change in the con-
sumption of good j .29 We find that the change in con-
sumer surplus from Equation (12) delivers a good ap-
proximation of the general equilibrium estimates of 
equivalent variation, for the proportional as well as the 
calibrated case.30 
The first two terms on the right-hand side of Equation 
(12) vary across households because of policy-driven 
changes in relative consumption good prices. We re-
fer to these two terms as capturing “consumption side” 
impacts. The third term varies because of differing pro-
portional changes in income. We refer to this term as re-
flecting “income side” impacts. It should be noted that 
this decomposition does not allow a comparison of the 
relative magnitude of consumption and income side im-
pacts at the household level, which is not pinned down 
and depends on the choice of the numeraire (Fullerton 
29  Similarly to Williams III et al. (2015) we normalize prices such 
that the average consumer price index, p _(avg,t ), remains constant. It is 
defined as: , where I _(upt ) is the pre-policy 
income of household type u  in province p  at time t  and x _(jupt ) is the 
pre-policy consumption of good j .
30  This can be seen in Figure B1 in the Appendix. 
& Metcalf, 2002). It does, however, capture differences 
within each term across households, which are not af-
fected by the choice of the numeraire.
The distribution of the first “first-order consumption” 
term across households captures differences in welfare 
impacts caused by policy-induced changes in relative 
prices and differences in consumption patterns among 
households, holding consumption quantities and in-
comes constant. More precisely, this term reflects the 
within-household covariance between proportional 
price changes and expenditure shares across sectors: 
households that intensively consume goods experiencing 
large price increases under the policy will be more ad-
versely affected. If the price changes were the same in all 
provinces, and if all households were to consume goods 
with the same intensity (expenditure shares were equal 
across all households), then the variability in impacts 
through this channel would be zero.
The “second-order consumption” term captures second 
order effects that mitigate the first order term through 
changes in consumption caused by the policy: house-
holds can at least partially substitute away from consum-
ing goods that experience a relative price increase.
The policy affects household incomes in many ways 
(among others through returns to factors of produc-
tion and recycled carbon price revenue). Households 
in provinces where industry is particularly hard hit by 
policy will experience larger losses on the income side, 
through the decrease in the returns of their productive 
factors. Further decomposing the third “income side” 
term is, however, not the focus of our paper, as we are 
mainly interested in comparing variation in income-side 
effects to variation in consumption-side effects, under 
homothetic and non-homothetic preferences. Equation 
(12) thus highlights a number of channels through which 
income-driven consumption shifts may affect the distri-
bution of welfare impacts: expenditure shares (θ), price 
changes under policy ( ), income changes ( ) and 
behavioral responses ( ). We distinguish two types of 
effects. On the one hand, household expenditure shares 
differ between the calibrated and proportional cases. This 
will cause given changes in relative prices under policy to 
translate to different distributions of welfare impacts. We 
will refer to this as the direct effect of changing consump-
tion patterns.
On the other hand, changing consumption patterns also 
have an indirect effect on the distribution of welfare im-
pacts, through a number of channels. First, income-driv-
en consumption shifts affect baseline emissions, and 
hence the absolute amount of emissions reduced by the 
policy. The differing stringency will in turn affect con-
sumption good price and income changes under policy, 
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through the (here, lower) economy-wide CO2 price. Sec-
ond, even abstracting from differences in policy stringen-
cy, non-homothetic preferences affect equilibrium good 
and factor prices through differing patterns of demand, 
and thus production, compared to the homothetic case.
Whereas the direct effect affects the consumption chan-
nel only, the indirect effect affects both the consumption 
and the income channel. We now tease out the relative 
importance of the direct effect.
5.2.2 Effect of Changing Consumption Patterns 
on Variation of Policy Impacts
The standard deviation of the terms in Equation (12) 
across all households (i.e., both urban and rural house-
holds in all provinces) are displayed in Table 6 and help 
identify the channels which drive the heterogeneous 
burden of climate policy. For both 2015 and 2030, the 
income channel has the highest standard deviation, fol-
lowed by the first-order consumption channel. The vari-
ation introduced through the second order consumption 
channel is significantly smaller, and will thus be ignored 
in the following. All standard deviations are increasing in 
time, driven by increasing policy stringency.
Both the consumption and income channels exhibit 
lower variability under calibrated preferences, although 
the difference is more pronounced for the consumption 
channel. On the income side, differences between the 
proportional and calibrated cases are caused by the in-
direct effect only, a result of the lower policy stringency 
(which affects welfare mainly through the lower carbon 
price and thus moderates differences between house-
holds, as well as other general equilibrium effects).
The fact that changing consumption patterns affect the 
variation of impacts on the consumption side more than 
on the income side suggests that the direct effect plays 
an important role in moderating the variation of con-
sumption side impacts (beyond the indirect effect, which 
affects both). To further single out this direct effect of 
changing consumption patterns on the consumption 
side, we compute the variability of the first-order con-
sumption impacts in a hypothetical economy in which 
relative goods prices are identical in the calibrated and 
proportional cases and fixed at the 2030 level, thus ab-
stracting from differences in policy stringency across 
preference assumptions and time. This is expressed by 
the standard deviation, across both urban and rural 
households in each province, of the following measure:  (13)
where θ _(j)^(P/C ) is the baseline expenditure shares for good j  in the proportional (P) and calibrated (C) cases, re-
spectively, and is the proportional change in the
price of good j  in 2030, for the proportional case. Table 7 
displays these standard deviations.
For fixed policy-driven price changes, the variation in 
direct consumption impacts of climate policy in the pro-
portional case increases in time. This result reflects the 
finding from Section 4.1 that, in the proportional case, 
the variation in household expenditure shares increases 
slightly, due to relative price changes in the baseline.
The picture in the calibrated case is very different: the 
direct consumption impacts of policy converge rapidly. 
This implies that income-driven changes in household 
consumption patterns are significantly stronger than the 
offsetting effect of changes in relative prices. Overall, dif-
ferences in the temporal evolution of consumption pat-
terns cause the standard deviation to be reduced by more 
than half relative to the proportional case—from 3.1% to 
Table 6. % consumption loss (–ΔS/I ): standard deviations by channel
1st order cons 2nd order cons. Income
Preferences: Calib. Prop. Calib. Prop. Calib. Prop.
2015 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.9
2030 1.1 3.1 0.1 0.6 5.2 7.8
Table 7. %consumption loss through first-order consumption effects, holding price changes fixed at 2030 proportional case values: 
standard deviations
Preferences: Proportional Calibrated
Year: 2007 2015 2030 2007 2015 2030
2.4 2.6 3.1 2.4 1.7 1.5
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1.5%. Comparing the 1.5% standard deviation in 2030 to 
the 1.1% from Table 6 suggests that a large part of the 
difference in the variation of consumption side impacts 
between the calibrated and proportional cases is due to 
the direct effect and is thus independent of differences 
in changes in relative consumption good prices under 
policy (caused mainly by the differing policy stringen-
cy). Note that this convergence in consumption patterns 
to a lesser extent drives a convergence in the production 
patterns and thus also indirectly reduces variability in in-
come side effects.
Policy-induced changes in relative prices predicted by 
the GE model are—to a first approximation—propor-
tional to differences in embodied carbon intensity. Thus, 
the convergence in impacts due to the direct effect im-
plies that differences in the embodied energy and average 
carbon intensity of consumption baskets across house-
holds is declining. In other words, rising income levels in 
China change consumption patterns in a way that leads 
embodied carbon emissions to converge. This implies a 
catch-up in relative decarbonization: low-income house-
holds decrease the energy-intensity of their consump-
tion baskets faster than high-income households. Using 
estimates of the average total carbon intensity of sectors 
from the 2007 base year31, we confirm that that, by 2030, 
the standard deviation in the average total carbon in-
tensity of household consumption across provinces (in 
kg/$) decreases from 0.17 to 0.09 (urban households) 
and from 0.18 to 0.09 (rural households), when moving 
from homothetic to non-homothetic preferences.
5.2.3 De-linking of the Income and Consumption 
Channels
In addition to the reduction in the variation of impacts 
through each channel, the variation of total impacts is 
also determined by the correlation between the channels. 
Our simulations suggest that this correlation in the first 
year of the policy (2015) is strong, as household types 
that experience above-average income losses also tend 
to consume a higher fraction of energy goods and be 
strongly affected on the consumption side. By 2030, in 
the proportional case, the correlation between the first 
order consumption and income channels is still posi-
tive and statistically significant at 0.39. In the calibrated 
case, on the other hand, this relationship is reversed: the 
correlation, −0.26, is negative (and not statistically sig-
nificant), further reducing the variation of total impacts 
compared to the proportional case.
We identify several potential explanations for this de-
coupling between income and consumption channels. 
31  These are computed using a standard multi-regional Leontief 
inversion of the base year input-output tables which tracks all the 
emissions embodied in the final demand for each good.
The first is through changes in the average tradability of 
the household consumption baskets. Calibrated non-ho-
mothetic preferences predict increased consumption 
of goods that tend to be more traded across provinces, 
leading to a reduced correlation between the geograph-
ical patterns of consumption and production. This is 
consistent with the fact that, within the set of tradable 
goods, income elastic goods tend to have higher export 
shares and be less sensitive to distance, as documented in 
Caron et al. (2014).
Low income elasticity goods are more likely to be both 
produced and consumed in the same provinces. For in-
stance, the correlation between relative specialization32 
in consumption and production across provinces is high 
for natural gas (0.70), agriculture (0.48) and coal (0.47) 
whereas it is only 0.16 for oil, 0.33 for electricity and 0.11 
for services. This implies that the correlation between 
the CO2 intensity of consumption and production across 
provinces decreases from 0.51 to 0.28, going from homo-
thetic to non-homothetic preferences.
Another source of decoupling is through the policy’s im-
pact on provincial labor wages (recall that capital costs 
are equalized across provinces in the model). Provinc-
es where industry is strongly affected by policy see their 
wages decrease, which reduces the price of locally-pro-
duced labor-intensive services. Demand for these ser-
vices tends to be relatively income elastic. Thus, in some 
provinces which combine carbon-intensive production 
(and are therefore very affected through the income 
channel) with a large number of middle or high income 
households, shifting consumption patterns towards ser-
vices decreases their consumption side impacts. Consid-
er the example of Shanxi (SX), the most affected province 
on the income side due to its role as a major coal pro-
ducer. The large impact of policy on the energy-inten-
sive and coal-producing industries in Shanxi depresses 
the demand for labor, driving down the local wage rate. 
This in turn reduces the price of services relative to oth-
er provinces. In the calibrated case, these price changes, 
combined with the relatively high share of household 
expenditure on services, cause households in Shanxi 
to be less adversely impacted than the average Chinese 
household. In the proportional case, on the other hand, 
rural households are more adversely impacted than the 
average Chinese households, due to their relatively high 
expenditure shares on coal, which is heavily targeted by 
policy. Greater vulnerability to carbon pricing offsets the 
beneficial effect of cheaper services under the policy.
In summary, we identify three main effects that cause the 
lower variation in policy-driven welfare impacts under 
32  Defined as the provinces share in consumption (production) in 
total Chinese consumption (production).
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calibrated non-homothetic relative to homothetic prefer-
ences: lower policy stringency, convergence in the energy 
intensity of household consumption, and decoupling be-
tween consumption- and income-side impacts.
5.2.4 Impacts on the Ranking of Winners and 
Losers from Climate Policy
Finally, we document the extent to which non-homo-
thetic preferences affect the ranking of household types, 
in terms of the welfare impacts of climate policy. Beyond 
the standard deviation of impacts, identifying expected 
winners and losers is also of interest to policy makers.
On the income side, the ranking is mostly unaffect-
ed by household preferences: Spearman’s coefficient of 
rank correlation of income side impacts between the 
calibrated or proportional preference cases is 0.990 (see 
Figure B2 in the Appendix for the relative distribution 
in impacts). The indirect effect of shifting consumption 
patterns thus affects household types similarly, despite 
the lower standard deviation found above.
On the consumption side, rank correlation between pro-
portional and calibrated preferences is instead only 0.714 
for the first order consumption channel (see Figure B3). 
This indicates that rank changes under calibrated relative 
to proportional preferences are driven by direct effects 
on the consumption side. Changes in consumption pat-
terns can thus substantially affect who will be profiting 
or suffering the most from carbon pricing. Differences 
in ranking through the consumption channel stem from 
differences in average income elasticity across goods, 
nonlinearities in the log Engel curves and differences in 
baseline incomes across household types.
The reduced correlation between consumption and in-
come channels under calibrated preferences is also very 
clear in terms of rankings. Figure 8, which plots each 
household types rank in consumption channel impacts 
against its rank in income channel impacts, illustrates 
the fact that many of the provinces which lose the most 
on the income side experience larger than average im-
provements on the consumption side under calibrated 
non-homothetic relative to homothetic preferences. 
6. Conclusions
This paper investigates interactions between the in-
come-driven dynamics of consumption patterns and cli-
mate policy, integrating Engel curve estimates from an 
energy-specific survey within an economy-wide calibrat-
ed general equilibrium model.
Figure 8. Rank of household welfare impacts through the income and consumption channels, for the proportional and calibrated 
cases. labels correspond to provinces that see a shift of at least 15 ranks between the two cases.
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In China, we find that the response of energy consump-
tion (direct and indirect) to income growth implied by 
the estimated Engel curves is low. Calibrating the model 
to non-homothetic preferences substantially lowers en-
ergy use and CO2 emissions projections. With calibrat-
ed preferences, direct household CO2 emissions are 61% 
lower by 2030 while national emissions drop by 8%. This 
is good news for the climate. Absent general equilibri-
um feedbacks, this reduction would be even more pro-
nounced, as a reduction in household demand lowers 
energy prices across the economy, prompting increased 
use in other sectors.
The fact that China’s household consumption “grows 
cleaner” over time also substantially reduces the cost of 
achieving a given climate policy target, by delivering the 
mitigation that would have otherwise required a higher 
CO2 price signal. While we model a specific CO2 inten-
sity policy consistent with China’s climate pledge, low-
er costs with calibrated preferences are expected under 
any type of energy or CO2 reduction policy. Our model 
also predicts that changing consumption patterns will 
reduce variations in energy-intensity across household 
consumption baskets, leading to a reduction in the 
variation in impacts and attenuating the regressivity of 
such policies.
Taken together, our results suggest that an ambitious cli-
mate policy in China may not have the dire impacts that 
models based on homothetic preferences would predict. 
Failing to capture this realism may erroneously weaken 
the case for ambitious policy. Viewed in this light, the 
extra investment in representing micro-level evolution of 
household consumption seems very worthwhile. While 
the implications of our study hold valuable lessons for 
other fast-growing developing countries, our findings are 
quantitatively and perhaps even qualitatively specific to 
China. While income growth may decrease the energy 
intensity of consumption in many countries, China’s case 
may be extreme. Widespread access to energy, even for 
the poorest households, is such that the estimated energy 
intensity of consumption decreases with income even for 
the poorest households. This is likely not to be the case 
in many lower-income countries, where we might expect 
the opposite: energy use and CO2 emissions would in-
crease relative to projections based on homothetic prefer-
ences for poor households. Overall energy intensity and 
associated policy costs might be predicted to increase, at 
least in the short term. In some countries, the energy-in-
tensity of consumption by the poorest households may 
also still further diverge from that of rich households. 
Distributional impacts of climate policy would thus also 
be predicted to further diverge.
Our approach for calibrating household preferences to 
estimated Engel curves for a wide range of goods within 
a broader general equilibrium framework could be repli-
cated or approximated for other countries, as long as reli-
able Engel curve estimates from micro-data are available. 
Numerous countries exhibit disparities in income which 
are comparable to those observed in China (Xie & Zhou, 
2014) and sufficiently large to perform in-sample projec-
tions of household consumption patterns such as ours. 
Doing so requires recognition of the methodology’s lim-
itations. Our results rely on cross-sectional data that ex-
ploit the large exiting variation in incomes and consump-
tion patterns, but do not allow testing of the assumptions 
that household preferences are indeed identical across 
households and constant in time. Our approach also does 
not allow making out-of-sample predictions regarding 
the behavior of the richest households. While we have 
avoided the issue by limiting our projections to the short 
and medium terms, long-term projections would require 
additional assumptions or the use of out-of-country data. 
Also, we have not translated the uncertainty inherent to 
our empirical estimates within the simulation exercise. 
These issues offer interesting avenues for future research.
While conclusions may differ across countries and the 
impact of consumption shifts is ultimately an empirical 
question, our exercise does point to the importance of 
taking such shifts into account and suggests more gen-
erally that projection or policy-analysis models—which 
widely rely on unitary income elasticities—may be sys-
tematically misrepresenting the evolution of energy de-
mand and emissions as household income rises in devel-
oping countries, yielding misleading policy prescriptions. 
Our findings also highlight the value of accounting for 
consumption shifts in a general equilibrium framework 
that enables the comparison of consumption and income 
side effects as well as their interactions. While our appli-
cation is focused on pricing energy and emissions, our 
insights are relevant for assessing the impact of any tax-
ation scheme focused on specific sectors and more gen-
erally public policies which target or interact, directly or 
indirectly, with patterns of household consumption.
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Appendix A. Issues specific to our model and data
Our model’s benchmark year is 2007, but the CRECS survey as well as the NBS data we use to 
estimate the income curves are from 2012. In order to use the estimated Engel curves consistent-
ly in the model, we therefore convert 2007 to 2012 prices and then look up the consumption at 
various income levels denominated in 2012 prices. The implicit GDP deflator is used to deter-
mine the rate of inflation (The World Bank, 2015). Our general method to calibrate preferences 
to Engel curves is limited to cases where the projected consumption of a good remains above the 
benchmark consumption level (i.e., y _(jupt ) ≥  x _(jupt0 ) .33 
This holds for a given good j  if its income elasticity of consumption is always positive. This is 
also the case if the income elasticity is initially positive, but later becomes negative as income 
grows—as long as the implied level of consumption never goes below the level in the benchmark 
year. For our model and data, however, consumption of COL and GAS for some provinces and 
households is decreasing to the point where the consumption levels drop below 2007 levels 
by 2030. For these goods, we thus resort to an alternative implementation of changing con-
sumption patterns. We do this by scaling benchmark consumption shares to target projected 
consumption at benchmark prices and projected real income. For all other goods, we employ 
the calibration described in Section 3.3.3. Regarding the convergence of the iterative routine 
involved in the calibration of preferences, we find that the difference in real income between the 
second and the first iteration of the calibration process varies widely by province and household 
type, with a magnitude relative to the 2030 real income as large as 10.5%. This difference drops 
sharply, and the fourth iteration delivers differences that are significantly lower than 0.1%, at 
which point we terminate the iteration. 
33  If this condition does not hold, the calibration would then imply c_(jupt ) > x _(jupt0 ) , and as a consequence θ̃  < 0 , 
which cannot hold.
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Appendix B. Additional graphs
Figure B1. %consumption loss in 2030: comparison between exact measure (equivalent variation) and approximation (consumer 
surplus), for the calibrated and the proportional cases.
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Figure B2. % welfare loss in 2030 through the income channel (relative to the population-weighted average impact through 
this channel).
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Figure B3. % welfare loss in 2030 through the 1st order consumption channel (relative to the population-weighted average impact 
through this channel).
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Appendix C. Equilibrium conditions for the general 
equilibrium model
We formulate our model as a non-linear complementarity problem (Rutherford, 1995).34 The 
economic equilibrium is characterized by a system of non-linear inequalities, comprizing zero 
profit and market clearing conditions.35 Zero-profit conditions are complementary to quantity 
variables, and market clearing conditions are complementary to price variables. Model vari-
ables and parameters are defined in Tables C1 to C4. We start by defining the unit cost func-
tions c , which enter the zero profit conditions. Household welfare is assumed to consist of a 
Cobb-Douglas function of household consumption, leisure, and savings. The associated cost 
function therefore assumes the following form:
The unit cost function for utility from consumption is defined as (Figure C1):36 
where PAT jr denote carbon cost inclusive Armington prices.37 For government and investment 
consumption, unit cost functions c ^(G)_(r ) and c ^(I)_(r ) are defined similarly as for private consumption 
(Figure C2):
34  As this part of the model is based on Zhang et al. (2013), the model description will follow the previous exposi-
tion closely. It is also similar to other descriptions of models of this type, such as Caron & Rausch (2013) and Abrell & 
Rausch (2016).
35  In general, a non-linear complementarity problem assumes the following form (Rutherford, 1995): given a func-
tion F : ℝ ^(n ) −→  ℝ ^(n ), find z ∈  ℝ ^(n ) such that F(z) ≥ 0, z ≥ 0, and z^(T )F(z) = 0, or, in compact notation, F(z) ≥ 0 ⊥  z ≥ 0, 
indicating complementarity between equilibrium condition and variable.
36  Prices denoted with an upper bar stand for tax-inclusive benchmark values. Note that, for simplicity, we abstract 
in the notation from the fact that such prices are differentiated across agents, due to differentiated tax rates. θ  general-
ly refers to share parameters.
37  The carbon cost is to be added to PA  in proportion to the good’s carbon intensity.
Figure C1. Structure of Private Consumption
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Unit cost functions for production activities j  ∈  {EIS, MAN, WTR, CON, TRN, SER, AGR, 
OMN} are given as (Figures C3 and C4):
where
Figure C4. Structure of Production for j  ∈  {AGR, OMN}
Figure C3. Structure of Production for j  ∈  {EIS, MAN, WTR, CON, TRN, SER}
Figure C2. Structure of Government Consumption and Investment
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Note that for Chinese provinces p, there is a single capital rental rate, since capital markets with-
in China are assumed to be integrated. Thus PK _(p ) ≡  PK ^(CHN ), ∀p  ∈  CHN. Unit cost functions for 
production activity j  ∈  {OIL} are analogous to those for i  ∈  {EIS, MAN, ... } from above, with 
the top level elasticity set to zero (Figure C5): The unit cost function for production activity j  ∈ 
{ELE} is given as (Figure C6):
where
and
Unit cost functions for production activities j  ∈  {COL, CRU, GAS} are given as (Figure C7):
where
Transporting commodity j  from region r  to region r′  requires services from the transporta-
tion sector. The import price for commodity j  produced in region r  and shipped to region r′ 
therefore amounts to: (1  + te _(jr ) P _(jr ) +  φ ^(T)_(jrr ′ )PT , for routes involving international transport 
and (1  + te _(jr ) P _(jr ) +  φ ^(T)_(jrr ′ )P _(TRN,r ) for domestic routes, where te _(jr ) is the export tax collected in 
region r  and φ ^(T)_(jrr ′ ) is the amount of (international or domestic) transport commodity needed to 
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Figure C6. Structure of Production for j  ∈  {ElE}
Figure C7. Structure of Production for j  ∈  {COAl, CRu, GAS}
Figure C5. Structure of Production for j  ∈  {OIl}
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transport commodity j . For simplicity, we abstract from import subsidies. The unit cost function 
for the Armington commodity for region r  is (Figures C8 and C9): 
The unit cost function for the imported composite in China province p  is:
The unit cost function for the domestic composite in China province p  is:
with
Figure C8. Aggregation of local, domestic, and foreign varieties of good j  for China province p
Figure C9. Aggregation of domestic and foreign varieties of good j  for international region s
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The unit cost function for the imported composite for international region s  is
with
The unit cost function for the domestic composite for international region s  is simply
International transport services are produced with transport services from each region accord-
ing to a Cobb-Douglas function:
where θ ^(T)_(r ) is the cost share of region r  transport commodity in the international transport ser-
vices composite. The model’s zero-profit conditions are then given by:
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Using Shephard’s lemma, market clearing equations become: 
 
where L̅ _(r ) ≡� _(h̅ )L̅ _(h̅r ), K̅ _(r ) ≡� _(h̅ )K̅ _(h̅r ), and L̅ _(h̅r )K̅ _(h̅r ), R̅ _(j h̅r , and R̅ _(nhw,h̅r ) are consumers’ endow-
ments of labor, capital, and natural resources, respectively. Household income in the model 
amounts to factor income net of a lump sum payment to the local government and of payment 
for minimum consumption. Government income is the sum of all tax revenues: 
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 Table C1. C-REM regions, sectors and households
Regions r  ∈ R Sectors j  ∈ J
AH Anhui HE Hebei QH Qinghai AGR Agriculture, forestry, livestock
BJ Beijing HI Hainan SC Sichuan COL Coal mining and processing
CQ Chongqing HL Heilongjiang SD Shandong CON Construction
FJ Fujian HN Hunan SH Shanghai CRU Crude petroleum products
GD Guandong JL Jilin SN Shaanxi EIS Energy intensive industries
GS Gansu JS Jiangsu SX Shanxi ELE Electricity and heat
GX Guanxi JX Jiangxi TJ Tianjin GAS Natural gas products
GZ Guizhou LN Liaoning XJ Xinjiang MAN Other manufacturing industries
HA Henan NM Inner Mongolia YN Yunnan OIL Oil refining, cooking & nuclear fuels
HB Hubei NX Ningxia ZJ Zhejiang OMN Minerals and other mining
EUR Europe ROW Rest of the World ODC Other Developed Countries SER Services
USA United States TRN Transportation and post
WTR Water
Household Types h̅  ∈ H
hh1 Urban (China) hh2 Rural (China) hh Undifferentiated (outside China)
Notes: Other Developed Countries include Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.
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Table C2. Other sets, price and quantity variables
Symbol Description
Setsg ∈ G ⊃  J Sectors (commodity production, private and public consumption, investment)s  ∈ INT ⊂  R International regionsp ∈ CHN ⊂  R Chinese provincesnhw ∈ NHW Nuclear, hydro and wind generated electricitycgo ∈ CGO Coal, Gas, Oil generated electricityj  ∈ ENE ⊂  J Energy commoditiesj  ∈  FOF ⊂  ENE Fossil fuel commoditiesj  ∈ NENE ⊂  J Non-energy commodities
Quantities and PricesY _(gr ) Production index of sector g  in region rA _(jr ) Armington index of commodity j  in region rM _(jr ) Imports of commodity j  in region r
YT International transportation servicesW _(h̅r ) Welfare of consumer h̅  in region rP _(gr ) Domestic output price for sector g  in region rPA _(jr ) Armington price of commodity j  in region rPD _(jr ) Price of domestic composite of commodity j  in region rPM _(jr ) Price of imported composite of commodity j  in region rPAT _(j ,g ,r ) Tax and carbon price inclusive Armington price of j , input to sector g , in region r
PT Price index of international transport servicesPS _(nhw,r ) Resource price for nhw  in region rPW _(h̅r ) Welfare index for consumer h̅  in region rPK _(r ) Capital rental rate in region rPL _(r ) Wage rate in region rPS _(jr ) Price for sector-specific resource for sector j  in region rP _(r)^(CGO ) Price of conventionally generated electricity in region rP _(nhw,r ) Price of electricity of type nhw  in region rINC ^(C)_(h̅r ) Private income of consumer h̅  in region rINC ^(G)_(r ) Government income in region r
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Table C3. Elasticities of substitution
Symbol Value Description
σ _(c top ) 1.0 Top level private consumption (transport vs. non-transport consumption)
σ _(cntrn ) 0.25 Energy vs. non-transport consumption composite
σ _(cene ) 0.4 Energy composite in consumption
σ _(c con ) 0.25 Non-transport composite in consumption
σ _(g i top ) 1.0 Top level public consumption/investment (energy vs. non-energy consumption)
σ _(g iene ) 1.0 Energy composite in public consumption/investment
σ _(y top ) 0.5 Top level (material vs. value added/energy inputs)
σ _(vae ) 0.5 Value added vs. energy composite
σ _(k le ) 1.0 Capital vs. labor and energy commodities
σ _(va ) 1.0 Value added composite
σ _(ene ) 0.5 Electricity vs. fuels composite
σ _(fo f ) 1.0 Fossil fuels in production
σ _(cgo ) 5.0 Conventional fossil electricity production composite
σ _(nhwtop ) 0.25 Top-level in NHW production (resource vs. value added and services composite)
σ _(a , j ) 0.9 - 11.9 Foreign (M) vs. domestic (D) commodities
σ _(o , j ) 0.9 - 11.9 Foreign, non-Chinese commodities
σ _(c , j ) 1.8 - 30.9 Chinese commodities
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Table C4. Other model parameters
Symbol Descriptionhtax _(h̅r ) Direct tax from household to local governmentpat _(jr ) Tax-inclusive reference Armington price for commodity jpl _(jr ) Tax-inclusive reference price for labor in production jpk _(jr ) Tax-inclusive reference price for capital in production jps _(jr ) Tax-inclusive reference price resources in production jpsnhw _(nhw,r ) Tax-inclusive reference price resources in production nhwpm _(jrr ′ ) Tax-inclusive import price for commodity j  shipped from region r  to region r ′t l _(jr ) Labor use tax in production jtk _(jr ) Capital use tax in production jto _(jr ) Output tax for commodity jts _(jr ) Use tax for sector j  specific resourcetsn _(nhw,r ) Use tax for sector nhw  specific resourcete _(jr ) Export tax for commodity jtd _(jr ) Domestic tax rate for commodity jtm _(jr)^(CHN ) Tax rate for imports of commodity j  from provinces in China to region rtm _(jr)^(INT ) Tax rate for imports of commodity j  from international regions to region rc_(j h̅ r ) Min. consumption level (Stone-Geary parameter) of commodity j  by household h̅  in region r
θ W,SAVh̅r Share of savings in top-level utility of household h̅  in region r
θ̃ W,CONh̅r Share of consumption (net of min. consumption) in top-level utility of household h̅  in region r
θ̃ TRNh̅r Exp. share (net of min. consumption) of transport in total exp. of household h̅  in region r
θ̃ CONh̅r Exp. share (net of min. consumption) of energy commodities in non-TRN exp.
θ̃ CENEjh̅r Exp. share (net of min. consumption) of commodities j  in total energy exp.
θ̃ CCONjh̅r Exp. share (net of min. consumption) of commodities j  in total non-energy, non-transport exp.
θ G/ICONr Exp. share of energy commodities in government/investment exp.
θ G/ICENEjr Exp. share of commodities j  in total energy exp. of government/investment sector
θ G/ICCONjr Exp. share of commodities j  in total non-energy exp. of government/investment sector/
θ TOPj ′  j r Share of non-energy commodity j ′ in top-level production j
θ RESjr Share of resources in top-level production j
θ VAEjr Share of value-added cost in value-added/energy cost bundle in production j
θ VAjr Share of labor cost in value added cost bundle in production j
θ ENEjr Share of electricity in energy bundle in production j
θ FOFj ′  j r Share of commodity j ′ cost in fossil fuel bundle in production j
θ Ajr Share domestic (including local for China) commodity j  in top-level Armington composite
θ Mjsp Share of j  imports from s in total international imports of commodity j  to province p
θ Djp′  p Share of j  imports from province p ′ in total domestic imports of commodity j  to province p
θ Djp Domestic share of j  in total domestic and local composite of commodity j  in province p
Notes: The production share parameters above are defined for commodities j ∈  {EIS, MAN, WTR, CON, TRN, SER, AGR, OMN}. 
For the remaining commodities, share parameters are defined analogously, but are omitted here for lack of space. Following the 
same logic, we omit the shares in the Armington aggregation for international regions.
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